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Abstract
This paper investigates the problem of secure communication in a wireline noiseless scenario where
a source wishes to communicate to a number of destinations in the presence of a passive external
adversary. Different from the multicast scenario, where all destinations are interested in receiving the
same message, in this setting different destinations are interested in different messages. The main
focus of this paper is on characterizing the secure capacity region, when the adversary has unbounded
computational capabilities, but limited network presence. First, an outer bound on the secure capacity
region is derived for arbitrary network topologies and general number of destinations. Then, secure
transmission schemes are designed and analyzed in terms of achieved rate performance. In particular,
for the case of two destinations, it is shown that the designed scheme matches the outer bound, hence
characterizing the secure capacity region. It is also numerically verified that the designed scheme matches
the outer bound for a special class of networks with general number of destinations, referred to as
combination network. Finally, for an arbitrary network topology with general number of destinations, a
two-phase polynomial time in the network size scheme is designed and its rate performance is compared
with the capacity-achieving scheme for networks with two destinations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure network coding [1] considers the communication from a source to a number of
destinations in the presence of a passive external adversary, with unbounded computational
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2capabilities, but limited network presence. The authors in [1] showed that the source can securely
multicast to all destinations at a rate of M − k, where M is the min-cut capacity between the
source and each destination, and k is the number of edges eavesdropped by the adversary. In
such a multicast scenario, all destinations are interested in receiving the same message.
In this paper, we focus on multiple unicast traffic, where a source wishes to securely com-
municate to a number of destinations, each interested in an independent message. Our primal
objective lies in characterizing the secure capacity region, by means of derivation of novel outer
bounds as well as transmission schemes.
A. Related Work
Network coding was pioneered by the seminal work of Ahlswede et al. [2]. The authors
proved that, if M is the min-cut capacity from the source to each destination, then the source can
multicast at a rate M to all the destinations. This result implies that, even if a single destination
with min-cut capacity M has access to the entire network resources, this destination can only
receive at most at a rate equal to M . Moreover, this result shows that multiple destinations
sharing some of the network resources, can still receive at a rate M if they are interested in
the exact same information. Later, Li et al. [3] proved that it suffices to use random linear
coding operations to characterize the multicast capacity. Jaggi et al. [4] designed polynomial
time deterministic algorithms aimed to achieve the multicast capacity. While for the case of
single unicast and multicast traffic the capacity is well-known, the same is not true for the
case of networks where multiple unicast sessions take place simultaneously and share some
of the network resources. For instance, even though the cut-set bound was proved to be tight
for some special cases, such as single source with non-overlapping demands and single source
with non-overlapping demands and a multicast demand [5], in general it is not tight [6]. It was
also recently showed by Kamath et al. [7] that characterizing the capacity of a general network
where two unicast sessions take place simultaneously is as hard as characterizing the capacity
of a network with general number of unicast sessions. For the case of single source and two
destinations with a non-overlapping demand and a multicast demand, Ramamoorthy et. al [8]
proposed a nice graph theory based approach to characterize the capacity region.
Information theoretic security, pioneered by Shannon [9], aims at ensuring a reliable and secure
communication among trusted parties inside a network such that a passive external eavesdropper
does not learn anything about the content of the information exchanged. For point-to-point
3channels, information theoretic security can be achieved provided that the communicating trusted
parties have a pre-shared key of entropy at least equal to the length of the message [9]. Wyner [10]
showed that, if the adversary’s channel is a degraded version of the channel to the legitimate
destination, then an information theoretic secure communication can be guaranteed even without
the pre-shared keys. Moreover, if public feedback is available, Czap et. al. [11] showed that secure
communication can be ensured over erasure networks even when the adversary has a channel of
better quality than the legitimate receiver. In [1], Cai et al. characterized the information theoretic
secure capacity of a noiseless network with unit capacity edges and with multicast traffic. In
this work, which was followed by several others [12], [13], a source wishes to multicast the
same information to a number of destinations in the presence of a passive external adversary
eavesdropping any k edges of her choice. In [14], Cui et al. studied networks with non-uniform
edge capacities when the adversary is allowed to eavesdrop only some specific subsets of edges.
Over the past few years, others notions of information theoretic security have been analyzed, such
as the case of weak information theoretic security [15], [16], [17]. Moreover, several different
scenarios have been studied, that include: (i) the case of an active adversary, who can indeed
corrupt the communication rather than just passively eavesdropping it [18], [19], [20]; (ii) erasure
networks where a public feedback is available [21], [22], [23]; (iii) wireless networks [24], [25].
B. Contributions
In this paper, we study the problem of characterizing the secure capacity region in a wireline
noiseless multiple unicast scenario with uniform edge capacities. In particular, we focus on
networks where a source wishes to securely communicate to a number of destinations, each
interested in a different message. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) We derive an outer bound on the secure capacity region for networks with arbitrary
topology and arbitrary number of destinations. Similar to the multicast scenario [1], this
outer bound depends on the number of edges that the adversary eavesdrops and on the
min-cut capacities between the source and different subsets of destinations.
2) We characterize the secure capacity region for networks with arbitrary topology and with
two destinations. Towards this end, we design a secure transmission scheme whose achieved
rate region is proved to match the derived outer bound. In particular, we leverage a key
property, referred to as separability [8], in order to select the parts of the network over
which: (i) common keys should be multicast, and (ii) encrypted private messages should
4be communicated. Our analysis shows that coding across different unicast sessions helps
in characterizing the secure capacity even in scenarios where coding was not required in
the absence of an adversary.
3) We design a secure transmission scheme for combination networks with a two-layer
topology and arbitrary number of destinations. A key feature of such networks is that they
satisfy the separability property over graphs. In particular, through extensive numerical
evaluations, we observed that the designed scheme achieves a secure rate region that
matches our derived outer bound, hence suggesting that the proposed scheme could be
capacity achieving.
4) We design a secure transmission scheme for networks with arbitrary topology and arbitrary
number of destinations. This scheme is sub-optimal, but has a polynomial time complexity
in the number of edges and nodes in the network. In particular, our scheme works in two
phases: in the first phase, we multicast keys using the entire network resources, and in the
second phase we communicate encrypted private message packets using again the entire
network resources. For the case of two destinations, we also compare the secure rate region
achieved by this two-phase with the secure capacity region.
5) We draw several observations on the derived secure capacity results. For instance, we
show that the secure capacity region for two destinations is non-reversible, which is a key
difference with respect to the case when there is no adversary. Specifically, we show that,
if we switch the role of the source and destinations and we reverse the directions of the
edges, then the new secure capacity region differs from the original one. Moreover, for the
case of two destinations, we compare the secure capacity region with the capacity region
when the adversary is absent. The goal of this analysis is to quantify the rate loss that is
incurred to guarantee security.
6) We consider other instances of multiple unicast traffic, that include: (i) networks with
erasure links, and (ii) noiseless networks with two sources and two destinations. In par-
ticular, for some specific network topologies, we derive the secure capacity region. This
analysis strengthens our previous observation that coding across different unicast sessions
is beneficial to ensure a secure communication, even for cases when it is not required in
the absence of an adversary.
5C. Paper Organization
Section II formally defines the setup, that is the multiple unicast wireline noiseless network
with single source and arbitrary number of destinations, and formulates the problem. Section III
derives an outer bound on the secure capacity region. Section IV provides a capacity-achieving
secure transmission scheme for networks with two destinations and arbitrary topology. Section V
designs a secure transmission scheme for combination networks with a two-layer topology
and arbitrary number of destinations. Section VI provides a two-phase achievable scheme for
networks with arbitrary number of destinations and arbitrary topology. Finally, Section VII draws
some observations on the derived results, discusses some properties and analyzes other instances
of multiple unicast traffic.
II. SETUP AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Throughout the paper we adopt the following notation convention. Calligraphic letters indicate
sets; ∅ is the empty set and |A| is the cardinality of A; for two sets A1,A2, A1 ⊆ A2 indicates
that A1 is a subset of A2, A1 ∪ A2 indicates the union of A1 and A2, A1 unionsq A2 indicates the
disjoint union of A1 and A2, A1 ∩A2 is the intersection of A1 and A2 and A1\A2 is the set of
elements that belong to A1 but not to A2; [n1 : n2] is the set of integers from n1 to n2 ≥ n1;
[n] is the set of integers from 1 to n ≥ 1; [x]+ := max{0, x} for x ∈ R; for a vector a, aT is
its transpose vector; dim(A) is the dimension of the subspace A; 0i×j is the all-zero matrix of
dimension i× j; Ij is the identity matrix of dimension j.
We represent a wireline noiseless network with a directed acyclic graph G = (V , E), where V is
the set of nodes and E is the set of directed edges. The edges represent orthogonal communication
links, which are interference-free. In particular, these links are discrete noiseless memoryless
channels over a common alphabet Fq, i.e., they are of unit capacity over a q-ary alphabet. If an
edge e ∈ E connects a node i to a node j, we refer to node i as the tail and to node j as the
head of e, i.e., tail(e) = i and head(e) = j. For each node v ∈ V , we define I(v) as the set of
all incoming edges of node v and O(v) as the set of all outgoing edges of node v.
In this network, there is one source node S and m destination nodes Di, i ∈ [m]. The source
node does not have any incoming edges, i.e., I(S) = ∅, and each destination node does not have
any outgoing edges, i.e., O(Di) = ∅,∀i ∈ [1 : m]. Source S has a message Wi for destination
Di, i ∈ [1 : m]. These m messages are assumed to be independent. Thus, the network consists
of multiple unicast traffic, where m unicast sessions take place simultaneously and share the
6network resources. In particular, each message Wi, i ∈ [m], is of q-ary entropy rate Ri. A passive
eavesdropper Eve is also present in the network and can wiretap any k edges of her choice. We
highlight that Eve is an external eavesdropper, i.e., it is not one of the destinations.
The symbol transmitted over n channel uses on edge e ∈ E is denoted as Xne . In addition, for
Et ⊆ E we define XnEt = {Xne : e ∈ Et}. We assume that the source node S has infinite sources
of randomness Θ, while the other nodes in the network do not have any randomness.
Over this network, we are interested in finding all possible feasible m-tuples (R1, R2, . . . , Rm)
such that each destination Di, i ∈ [m], reliably decodes the message Wi (with zero error) and
Eve receives no information about the content of the messages. In particular, we are interested in
ensuring perfect information theoretic secure communication, and hence we aim at characterizing
the secure capacity region, which is next formally defined.
Definition 1 (Secure Capacity Region). A rate m-tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm) is said to be securely
achievable if there exist a block length n and a set of encoding functions fe, ∀e ∈ E , with
Xne =
 fe
(
W[m], θ
)
if tail(e) = S,
fe ({Xn` : ` ∈ I(tail(e))}) otherwise,
such that each destination Di can reliably decode the message Wi i.e., H (Wi|{Xne : e ∈ I(Di)}) =
0, ∀i ∈ [m]. Moreover, ∀ EZ ⊆ E , |EZ | ≤ k, I
(
W[m];X
n
EZ
)
= 0 (perfect secrecy requirement).
The secure capacity region is the closure of all such feasible rate m-tuples.
Definition 2 (Min-cut). A cut is an edge set EA ⊆ E , which separates the source S from a set
of destinations DA := {Di, i ∈ A}. In a network with unit capacity edges, the minimum cut or
min-cut is a cut that has the minimum number of edges.
III. OUTER BOUND
In this section, we derive an outer bound on the secure capacity region of a multiple unicast
wireline noiseless network with a single source and m destinations. In particular, as stated in
Theorem 1, this region depends on the min-cut capacities between the source and different
subsets of destinations, and on the number of edges that the adversary eavesdrops. The next
theorem provides the outer bound region.
7Theorem 1. An outer bound on the secure capacity region for the multiple unicast traffic over
networks with a single source and m destinations is given by
RA ≤ [MA − k]+, ∀A ⊆ [m] , (1)
where RA :=
∑
i∈A
Ri and MA is the min-cut capacity between the source S and the set of
destinations DA := {Di : i ∈ A}.
Proof. Let EA be a min-cut between the source S and DA and EZ ⊆ EA be the set of k edges
wiretapped by Eve, and define I(DA) :=
⋃
i∈A I(Di). If |EA| < k, let EZ = EA. We have,
nRA = H(WA)
(a)
= H(WA)−H(WA|XnI(DA))
(b)
= H(WA)−H(WA|XnEA)
(c)
= I(WA;XnEZ , X
n
EA\EZ )
= I(WA;XnEZ ) + I(WA;X
n
EA\EZ |XnEZ )
(d)
= I(WA;XnEA\EZ |XnEZ )
(e)
≤ H(XnEA\EZ )
(f)
≤ n[MA − k]+ ,
where WA = {Wi, i ∈ A} and where: (i) the equality in (a) follows because of the decodability
constraint (see Definition 1); (ii) the equality in (b) follows because XnI(DA) is a deterministic
function of XnEA; (iii) the equality in (c) follows from the definition of mutual information
and since EA = EZ ∪ EA\Z ; (iv) the equality in (d) follows because of the perfect secrecy
requirement (see Definition 1); (v) the inequality in (e) follows since the entropy of a discrete
random variable is a non-negative quantity and because of the ‘conditioning reduces the entropy’
principle; (vi) finally, the inequality in (f) follows since each link is of unit capacity and since
|EA \ EZ | = [MA − k]+. By dividing both sides of the above inequality by n we obtain that
RA in (1) is an outer bound on the secure capacity region of the multiple unicast traffic over
networks with single source and m destinations. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 1. Since the eavesdropper Eve wiretaps any k edges of her choice, intuitively Theorem 1
states that, if she wiretaps k edges of a cut with capacity M , we can at most hope to reliably
transmit at rate M − k. However, this holds only for the case of single source; indeed, as we
8will see in Section VII-B through an example, higher rates can be achieved for networks having
a single destination and multiple sources.
IV. CAPACITY ACHIEVING SCHEME FOR NETWORKS WITH TWO DESTINATIONS
In this section, we prove that the outer bound in Theorem 1 is indeed tight for the case of
m = 2 destinations. Towards this end, we design a secure transmission scheme whose achievable
rate region matches the outer bound in Theorem 1. In particular, our main result is stated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. The outer bound in (1) is tight for the case m = 2, i.e., the secure capacity region
of the multiple unicast traffic over networks with single source and m = 2 destinations is
R1 ≤ [M{1} − k]+ , (2a)
R2 ≤ [M{2} − k]+ , (2b)
R1 +R2 ≤ [M{1,2} − k]+ . (2c)
Proof. Clearly, from the result in Theorem 1, the rate region in (2) is an outer bound on the
secure capacity region. Hence, we now need to prove that the rate region in (2) is also achievable.
Towards this end, we start by providing the following definition of separable graphs, which we
will leverage in the design of our scheme.
Definition 3 (Separable Graph). A graph G = (V , E) with a single source and m destinations
is said to be separable if its edge set E can be partitioned as E = unionsq2m−1`=1 E ′` such that G ′` =
(V , E ′`), ∀` ∈ [2m − 1] and
MA =
∑
J⊆[m]
J∩A6=∅
M?J , ∀A ⊆ [m] , (3)
where MA is the min-cut capacity between the source S and the set of destinations DA := {Di :
i ∈ A} in G and M?J is the min-cut capacity between the source S and the set of destinations
DB := {Db : b ∈ B}, ∀B ⊆ J for the graph G ′` with ` ∈ [1 : 2m − 1] being the decimal
representation of the binary vector of length m that has a one in all the positions indexed by
j ∈ J and zero otherwise, with the least significant bit in the first position.
To better understand the above definition, consider a graph G with m = 2 destinations. Then,
the graph G is separable if it can be partitioned into 3 graphs such that:
9• G ′1 has the following min-cut capacities: M?{1} from S to D1 and zero from S to D2,
• G ′2 has the following min-cut capacities: zero from S to D1 and M?{2} from S to D2,
• G ′3 has the following min-cut capacities: M?{1,2} from S to D1, M?{1,2} from S to D2 and
M?{1,2} from S to {D1, D2},
where the quantities M?{1}, M
?
{2} and M
?
{1,2} can be computed using the following set of equations:
M{1} = M?{1} +M
?
{1,2} , (4a)
M{2} = M?{2} +M
?
{1,2} , (4b)
M{1,2} = M?{1} +M
?
{2} +M
?
{1,2} . (4c)
We now state the following lemma, which is a consequence of [8, Theorem 1] and we will use
to prove the achievability of the rate region in (2).
Lemma 3. Any graph with a single source and m = 2 destinations is separable.
For completeness we report the proof of Lemma 3 in Appendix A. By leveraging the result in
Lemma 3, we are now ready to prove Theorem 2. In particular, we consider two cases depending
on the value of k (i.e., the number of edges that the eavesdropper wiretaps). Without loss of
generality, we assume that k < mini∈[2]Mi, as otherwise secure communication to the set of
destinations {Di : k ≥ Mi} is not possible at any rate, and hence we can just remove this set
of destinations from the network.
1) Case 1: k ≥M?{1,2}. In this case, by substituting the quantities in (4) into (2), we obtain that
the constraint in (2c) is redundant. Thus, we will now prove that the rate pair (R1, R2) =
(M{1} − k,M{2} − k) is securely achievable, which along with the time-sharing argument
proves the achievability of the entire rate region in (2).
We denote with K1, K2, . . . , Kk the k key packets and with W
(1)
i ,W
(2)
i , . . . ,W
(Ri)
i (with
i ∈ [2]) the Ri message packets for Di. With this, our scheme is as follows:
• We multicast Ki, ∀i ∈ [M?{1,2}], to both D1 and D2 using G ′3, which has edges denoted
by E ′3. This is possible since G ′3 has a min-cut capacity M?{1,2} to both D1 and D2 (see
Definition 3).
• We unicast K`,∀` ∈ [M?{1,2} + 1 : k], to Di, ∀i ∈ [2], using k −M?{1,2} paths out of
the M?{i} disjoint paths in G ′i. We denote by Eˆi the set that contains all the first edges
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of these paths. Clearly, |Eˆi| = k −M?{1,2},∀i ∈ [2]. Notice that Eˆi ⊆ E ′i ,∀i ∈ [2] (see
Definition 3).
• We send the Ri,∀i ∈ [2], encrypted message packets (i.e., encoded with the keys)
of Di on the remaining M?{i} − k + M?{1,2} disjoint paths in G ′i. We denote by E¯i the
set that contains all the first edges of these paths in G ′i. Clearly, |E¯i| = Ri,∀i ∈ [2],
E¯i ⊆ E ′i and E¯i ∩ Eˆi = ∅ (see Definition 3).
This scheme achieves Ri = M?{i} − k +M?{1,2} = M{i} − k,∀i ∈ [1 : 2], where the second
equality follows by using the definitions in (4). Now we prove that this scheme is also
secure. We start by noticing that, thanks to Definition 3, the edges E ′3, Eˆi and E¯i, with
i ∈ [2], do not overlap. We write these transmissions in a matrix form (with G and U
being the encoding matrices) and we obtain

XE ′3
XEˆ1
XEˆ2
 =

g11 g12 . . . g1k
g21 g22 . . . g1k
...
... . . .
...
g`1 g`2 . . . g`k

︸ ︷︷ ︸
G

K1
K2
...
Kk
 , ` = |E ′3|+ 2
(
k −M?{1,2}
)
,
 XE¯1
XE¯2
 =

u11 u12 . . . u1k
u21 u22 . . . u2k
...
... . . .
...
ur1 ur2 . . . urk

︸ ︷︷ ︸
U

K1
K2
...
Kk
⊕

W
(1)
1
...
W
(R1)
1
W
(1)
2
...
W
(R2)
2

, r = R1 +R2 .
The eavesdropper Eve wiretaps k1 ≤ k edges from the collection of edges {E ′3, Eˆ1, Eˆ2}, over
which the linear combinations XE ′3 , XEˆ1 and XEˆ2 of keys are transmitted, and k2 = k− k1
edges from the collection of edges {E¯1, E¯2} over which the messages encoded with the keys
XE¯1 and XE¯2 are transmitted. We here note that on the other edges E\{E ′3∪Eˆ1∪E¯1∪Eˆ2∪E¯2}
of the network, we either do not transmit any symbol or simply route the symbols from
{XE¯1 , XE¯2 , XEˆ1 , XEˆ2} (corresponding to the symbols transmitted on disjoint paths). Thus,
without loss of generality, we can assume that Eve does not wiretap any of these edges.
Since the first |E ′3| rows of G (i.e., those that correspond to multicasting the keys) are
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determined by the network coding scheme for multicasting [2], we assume that we do not
have any control over the construction of G.
Thus, we would like to construct the code matrix U such that all the linear combinations
of the keys used to encrypt the messages on k2 edges are mutually independent and are
independent from the linear combinations of the keys wiretapped on the k1 edges (notice
that this makes the symbols wiretapped by the eavesdropper completely independent from
the messages). In particular, since in the worst case Eve wiretaps k1 edges which are
independent linear combinations, we would like that any matrix formed by k1 independent
rows of the matrix G and k2 rows of the matrix U is full rank. Since there is a finite
number of such choices and the determinant of each of these possible matrices can be
written in a polynomial form – which is not identically zero – as a function of the entries
of U , then we can choose the entries of U such that all these matrices are invertible. Thus,
we can always construct the code matrix U such that the edges wiretapped by Eve have
independent keys and hence Eve does not get any information about the message packets,
i.e., the scheme is secure. This implies that the rate pair (R1, R2) = (M{1}− k,M{2}− k)
is securely achievable.
2) Case 2: k < M?{1,2}. By substituting the quantities in (4), the rate region in (2) becomes
Ri ≤M{i} − k = M?{i} +M?{1,2} − k,∀i ∈ [2] , (5a)
R1 +R2 ≤M{1,2} − k = M?{1} +M?{2} +M?{1,2} − k . (5b)
We now show that we can achieve the following two corner points i.e., the rate pair
(R1, R2) =
(
α(M{1,2} −M{2}) + (1− α)(M{1} − k),
α(M{2} − k) + (1− α)(M{1,2} −M{1})
)
(a)
= (M?{1} + α(M
?
{1,2} − k),M?{2} + (1− α)(M?{1,2} − k)) , (6)
for α ∈ {0, 1}, where the equality in (a) follows by using the definitions in (4). This along
with the time-sharing argument proves the achievability of the entire rate region in (5). We
recall that we denote with K1, K2, . . . , Kk the k key packets and with W
(1)
i ,W
(2)
i , . . . ,W
(Ri)
i
(with i ∈ [2]) the Ri message packets for Di. With this, our scheme is as follows:
• Using the graph G ′3 we multicast to both destinations D1 and D2: (i) Ki,∀i ∈ [k], (ii)
α(M?{1,2} − k) encrypted message packets (i.e., encoded with the keys) for D1 and
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(iii) (1− α)(M?{1,2} − k) encrypted message packets for D2. Recall that the edges of
the graph G ′3 are denoted by E ′3 (see Definition 3). We also highlight that the message
packets multicast to the two destinations are encrypted using the key packets, where
the encryption is based on the secure network coding result on multicasting [1], which
ensures perfect security from an adversary wiretapping any k edges.
• We send M?{i} encrypted message packets of Di on the M
?
{i} disjoint paths to Di in
the graph G ′i, and denote by Eˆi the set that contains all the first edges of these paths
for i ∈ [2].
This scheme achieves the rate pair in (6). Now we prove that this scheme is also secure.
For ease of representation, in what follows we let R?1 = α(M
?
{1,2} − k) and R?2 = (1 −
α)(M?{1,2}−k). We again notice that, thanks to Definition 3, the edges E ′3, Eˆ1 and Eˆ2 do not
overlap. We write these transmissions in a matrix form (with G, U and S being encoding
matrices) and we obtain,
XE ′3 =

g11 g12 . . . g1k
g21 g22 . . . g1k
...
... . . .
...
g`1 g`2 . . . g`k

︸ ︷︷ ︸
G

K1
K2
...
Kk
⊕

s11 s12 . . . s1k
s21 s22 . . . s1k
...
... . . .
...
s`1 s`2 . . . s`k

︸ ︷︷ ︸
S

W
(1)
1
...
W
(R?1)
1
W
(1)
2
...
W
(R?2)
2

, ` = |E ′3| ,
 XEˆ1
XEˆ2
=

u11 u12 . . . u1k
u21 u22 . . . u2k
...
... . . .
...
ur1 ur2 . . . urk

︸ ︷︷ ︸
U

K1
K2
...
Kk
⊕

m
(R?1+1)
1
...
W
(R1)
1
W
(R?2+1)
2
...
W
(R2)
2

, r=R1+R2−(M?{1,2}−k) .
The eavesdropper Eve wiretaps k1 ≤ k edges from E ′3, over which the linear combinations
XE ′3 of key packets and message packets are sent, and k2 = k−k1 edges from the collection
of edges {Eˆ1, Eˆ2} over which the messages encoded with the keys XEˆ1 and XEˆ2 are
transmitted. Similar to Case 1, on the other edges E\{E ′3∪Eˆ1∪Eˆ2} of the network, we either
do not transmit any symbol or simply route the symbols from {XEˆ1 , XEˆ2} (corresponding
to the symbols transmitted on disjoint paths). Thus, without loss of generality, we can
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Fig. 1: A 2-destination separable network G0 in (a) and its partition graphs G ′i, i ∈ [3] in (b)-(d).
assume that the eavesdropper does not wiretap any of these edges. Since the matrices G
and S are determined by the secure network coding scheme for multicasting [1], we do
not have any control over their construction. Thus, we would like to construct the code
matrix U in order to ensure security. Again, similar to the argument used in Case 1, we
can create U such that any subset of k2 rows of U are linearly independent and not in the
span of any subset of k1 rows of G. With this, the keys used to encrypt the messages over
any k2 edges of {Eˆ1, Eˆ2} are mutually independent and independent from the keys used
over any k1 edges of E ′3. This, together with the fact that the messages transmitted using
G ′3 are already secure, makes our scheme secure. This implies that the rate pair (R1, R2)
in (6) is securely achievable.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
We next illustrate the above described scheme for the network G0 in Fig. 1(a). We first note
that G0 has min-cut capacities M{1} = M{2} = 3 and M{1,2} = 4, and it can be partitioned into
three graphs G ′i, i ∈ [3], as shown in Figs. 1(b)-(d), with min-cut capacities equal to M?{1} =
M?{2} = 1 and M
?
{1,2} = 2, respectively. We assume that the adversary eavesdrops any k = 2
edges of her choice. For this case, the source should be able to securely communicate at a rate
(R1, R2) = (1, 1) towards the m = 2 destinations. This rate pair can be achieved as follows:
1) Over the set of edges in G ′1, the source transmits W1 ⊕K1 ⊕ 2K2; the intermediate node
simply routes this transmission to D1;
2) Over the set of edges in G ′2, the source transmits W2 ⊕K1 ⊕ 3K2; the intermediate node
simply routes this transmission to D2;
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Fig. 2: Example of a non-separable graph.
3) Over the set of edges in G ′3, the source transmits K1 to one intermediate node and K2 to
the other intermediate node. The intermediate node denoted as i in Fig. 1(d) receives K1
and K2 and transmits K1⊕K2 on its outgoing edges. Note that with this strategy D1 and
D2 receives K1 and K2. It therefore follows that Di, i ∈ [2], can successfully recover Wi.
We conclude this section with an observation on separable graphs. In particular, we show that,
although for the case of m = 2 destinations any graph is separable, in general the same does
not hold for m ≥ 3.
Remark 2. Consider the network in Fig. 2, which consists of m = 3 destinations and has
the following min-cut capacities: M{1} = 1, M{2} = 1, M{3} = 1, M{1,2} = 2, M{2,3} = 2,
M{1,3} = 2 and M{1,2,3} = 2. With this, we can find M?J , J ⊆ [3], by solving (3). In particular,
we obtain: M?{1} = M
?
{2} = M
?
{3} = 0, M
?
{1,2} = M
?
{2,3} = M
?
{1,3} = 1 and M
?
{1,2,3} = −1. Since
a graph can not have a negative min-cut capacity, we readily conclude that a separation of the
form defined in Definition 3 is not possible.
V. SECURE SCHEME FOR COMBINATION NETWORKS
In this section, we focus on a special class of networks, referred to as combination networks,
and design a secure transmission scheme. Before delving into the study of such networks, we note
that the capacity-achieving scheme for m = 2 destinations described in Section IV uses some
part of the network to multicast the keys and the remaining part to communicate the encrypted
messages (i.e., messages encoded with the keys). Therefore, we now ask the following question:
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Fig. 3: Network example to show that using different parts of the network to transmit the keys
and the encrypted messages is not optimal.
can we extend this idea to get a capacity-achieving scheme for networks with arbitrary number
of destinations? In other words, can we separate, over different parts of the network, the key
transmissions and the message transmissions? We next show that this is not possible through
an example. Consider the network shown in Fig. 3, which consists of m = 3 destinations,
and where the adversary can eavesdrop any k = 3 edges of her choice. For this network we
have the following min-cut capacities: M{1} = M{2} = M{3} = 4, M{1,2} = M{1,3} = M{2,3} =
M{1,2,3} = 6. We would like to show that the triple (R1, R2, R3) = (1, 1, 1) – obtained from
the outer bound in Theorem 1 – can not be achieved when the key packets and the encrypted
messages are transmitted over different parts of the network. It is not difficult to see that, out of
the 6 outgoing edges from the source, multicasting 3 keys1 requires a number of edges strictly
greater than 4. Thus, we would be left with strictly less than 2 edges, which are not sufficient
to transmit 3 message packets, i.e., one for each destination. It therefore follows that, with this
strategy, the rate triple (R1, R2, R3) = (1, 1, 1) can not be securely achieved.
However, we now design a transmission scheme, where the messages and the keys are encoded
jointly and show that the rate triple (R1, R2, R3) = (1, 1, 1) can indeed be securely achieved. In
what follows, we let: (i) Wi, i ∈ [3], be the message for Di, (ii) Ki, i ∈ [3], be the three random
1Note that 3 keys are required since the adversary eavesdrops k = 3 edges of her choice.
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packets transmitted by the source to guarantee security (recall that the eavesdropper wiretaps
any k = 3 edges of her choice), and (iii) Xi, i ∈ [6], be the symbols transmitted by the source on
its outgoing edges (enumerated from left to right with reference to Fig. 3). Intermediate nodes
simply route the received symbols on their outgoing edges, i.e., there is no coding operation at
the intermediate nodes. With this, we now define our scheme in matrix form as follows,
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6

=

0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 2 4
1 0 0 1 3 2
4 6 4 1 4 2
2 4 2 1 5 4

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

W1
W2
W3
K1
K2
K3

, (7)
where B ∈ F7 is the encoding matrix. We start by noting that, for every set of 3 edges, we
have linearly independent keys added to the linear combinations of messages, and hence the
scheme is secure. Moreover, the destinations can successfully recover their message by using
the following decoding scheme:
• Destination 1: W1 = 6X1 + 3X2 + 4X3 +X4,
• Destination 2: W2 = 6X1 + 4X2 + 3X5 +X6,
• Destination 3: W3 = 5X3 + 6X4 +X5 + 2X6 .
Thus, the rate triple (R1, R2, R3) = (1, 1, 1) can be securely achieved. This example shows
that using different parts of the network to transmit the keys and the encrypted messages, in
general is not optimal. This is partially due to the fact that destinations do not need to decode
each key individually, as long as they can successfully recover their message.
A. Secure Transmission Scheme
We now leverage the observations drawn for the network in Fig. 3 to design a secure transmis-
sion scheme for a class of networks, referred to as combination networks. As formally defined
in Definition 4, these networks have a two-layer topology, they are separable (see Definition 3)
and they can have an arbitrary number of destinations.
Definition 4 (Combination Network). A combination network parameterized by (t,m, {Mi,∀i ∈
[m]}) is defined as follows. The source node S is connected to t intermediate nodes that form
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Fig. 4: An example of a combination network with t = 6 and m = 3.
the first layer of the network. Each intermediate node has one incoming edge from the source.
On the second layer, there are m destination nodes D1, D2, . . . , Dm, such that Di, i ∈ [m], is
connected to a subset of intermediate nodes given by Mi ⊆ [t]. Each destination has at most
one incoming edge from intermediate node i ∈ [t].
An example of combination network is shown in Fig. 4, for which t = 6, m = 3, and
M1 = {1, 2, 4}, M2 = {3, 4, 5, 6} and M3 = {2, 3}.
The rate region achieved by our designed secure transmission scheme depends on m carefully
constructed null spaces. We observe that each receiver Di will use Ri vectors to “decode” (we
will refer to these as “decoding vectors”), to retrieve the Ri messages it requests. These vectors
need to enable to cancel out the keys, need to be linearly independent, and need to use only
the encoded transmissions of the source that the receiver has access to. The intuition behind our
scheme design is to construct the null spaces where these decoding vectors reside. We now
show the construction of such null spaces. Consider a Vandermonde matrix V with k rows and
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t columns as shown in (8), where αi ∈ Fq,∀i ∈ [t], are all distinct.
V =

1 1 . . . 1
α1 α2 . . . αt
...
αk−11 α
k−1
2 . . . α
k−1
t
 . (8)
Note that t > k, otherwise secure communication is not possible, i.e., if k ≥ t, then the adversary
wiretaps the entire communication from the source. Since V is a Vandermonde matrix, it has
the property that any any k × k submatrix is full rank, i.e., any set of k columns are linearly
independent. Moreover, the right null space of V is of dimension t−k. This matrix will be used
to encode the keys. For each destination Di, i ∈ [m], we consider the following matrix Vi:
Vi =
 V
Ci
 , (9)
where Ci is a matrix having t − |Mi| rows and t columns. The rows of Ci are given by
{cj, j ∈ [t] \ Mi}, where cj is a vector of length t with a one in the j-th position and zeros
everywhere else. The role of the matrix Ci is to restrict receiver Di to only use the source
encoded transmissions it actually has access to. For instance, with reference to the example in
Fig. 4, we would have
C1 =

0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , C2 =
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
 , C3 =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 .
With this construction, we have that: (i) all rows of V are linearly independent ( because of the
property of the Vandermonde matrix in (8)); (ii) all rows of Ci are linearly independent; (iii) any
vector in the span of the rows of V has a weight of at least t−k+1 (because V is the generator
matrix of a (t, k, t− k + 1) Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code); (iv) any vector in the
span of the rows of Ci has a weight of at most t− |Mi|. Thus, as long as t− k+ 1 > t− |Mi|,
i.e., |Mi| ≥ k, then all rows of Vi are linearly independent. Let Ni be the right null space of
Vi, then Ni will be of dimension t − (k + t − |Mi|), i.e., |Mi| − k if |Mi| ≥ k. For the case
when |Mi| < k, Vi will be a full rank matrix of rank t and Ni will be an empty space. Thus,
dim(Ni) = [|Mi| − k]+ ,∀i ∈ [m]. (10)
19
TABLE I: Notation used for the secure transmission scheme over combination networks.
Quantity Definition
ei Edge from the source S to the intermediate node i ∈ [t]
Xei Symbols transmitted on edge ei, i ∈ [t]
Wi Message packet for Di, i ∈ [m] such that Wi := [W (1)i ,W (2)i , . . . ,W (Ri)i ]
Ki, i ∈ [k] Random packet to ensure secure communication, with K := [K1,K2, . . . ,Kk]
With the definition of the null spaces Ni, i ∈ [m], above, we are now ready to present our
achievable rate region for combination networks.
Proposition 4. For the combination network (t,m, {Mi,∀i ∈ [m]}), assume that, for all i ∈ [m],
we can select Ri vectors from Ni such that the selected
m∑
i=1
Ri vectors are linearly independent.
Then, the rate tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm) is securely achievable and the convex hull of all these
feasible rate tuples is the achievable region.
Proof. We next describe the different encoding/decoding operations of our scheme for a specific
tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm) that satisfies the condition in Proposition 42. Towards this end, we use
the notation summarized in Table I.
• Encoding. The source S transmits the following symbols on its outgoing edges[
Xe1 Xe2 . . . Xet
]T
=
[
E V T
] [
W1 W2 . . . Wm K
]T
, (11)
where E is a matrix of t rows and
∑m
i=1 Ri columns, and V is the Vandermonde matrix
defined in (8). Upon receiving a transmission from the source S, the intermediate node i ∈ [t]
simply routes this transmission on its outgoing edges, i.e., there is no coding operation at
the intermediate nodes.
• Security. Since any k rows of V T are linearly independent, then any set of k symbols
transmitted on the first layer – and similarly on the second layer, since each intermediate
node simply routes the received transmission on its outgoing edges – are encoded with
independent keys. Thus, the adversary that eavesdrops k edges will not be able to obtain
any information about the messages, i.e., the scheme is secure.
2We assume that the Ris with i ∈ [m] are all integers. This assumption is without loss of generality since: (i) rational Ris
can be characterized by time-sharing the network with integer values of achievable rate tuples; (ii) rate tuples over real numbers
can be approximated with rational rate tuples.
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• Decoding. Each receiver Di will use the Ri linearly independent vectors to multiply the
vector
[
Xe1 Xe2 . . . Xet
]T
, and retrieve the Ri private messages it requests. Note that,
because of the null spaces construction, each receiver only observes the symbols it actually
has access to, and each receiver is able to cancel out the keys. In Appendix B, we prove
that there exists a choice of the matrix E in (11), which ensures that all the destinations
reliably decode their intended messages.
B. On the Optimality of the Designed Secure Transmission Scheme
We now conclude this section with a discussion on the rate performance achieved by the
proposed secure transmission scheme. Towards this end, we start by noting that, for a combination
network with parameters (t,m, {Mi, ∀i ∈ [m]}), the min-cut capacity between the source S and
the set of destinations DA := {Di : i ∈ A} is given by MA =
∣∣∣∣ ⋃
i∈A
Mi
∣∣∣∣. By substituting this
inside (1) in Theorem 1, we get the following outer bound,
Corollary 5. An outer bound on the secure capacity region for the multiple unicast traffic over
the combination network with parameters (t,m, {Mi,∀i ∈ [m]}) is given by
RA ≤
[∣∣∣∣∣⋃
i∈A
Mi
∣∣∣∣∣− k
]+
, ∀A ⊆ [m] , (12)
where RA :=
∑
i∈A
Ri.
We now prove that our designed secure transmission scheme is indeed optimal for the case of
m = 2 destinations. In other words, we show that the outer bound in Corollary 5 is achievable
when m = 2. Formally, we have
Proposition 6. For the combination network with parameters (t, 2, {Mi,∀i ∈ [2]}), the secure
capacity region is given by
R1 ≤ [|M1| − k]+ , (13a)
R2 ≤ [|M2| − k]+ , (13b)
R1 +R2 ≤ [|M1 ∪M2| − k]+ . (13c)
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Proof. Clearly, from the result in Corollary 5, the rate region in (13) is an outer bound on
the secure capacity region. Hence, we now need to prove that the rate region in (13) is also
achievable. This proof can be found in Appendix C.
Although we could prove the optimality of our designed secure transmission scheme only
for the case of m = 2 destinations, we performed extensive numerical evaluations that indeed
suggest that the scheme could be optimal even for the case of larger values of m. In particular,
in our simulations we considered up to m = 8 destinations and, for all the considered network
configurations, we verified that the rate region achieved by our designed scheme coincides with
the outer bound in (12).
VI. POLYNOMIAL TIME SCHEME FOR NETWORKS WITH ARBITRARY TOPOLOGIES AND
ARBITRARY NUMBER OF DESTINATIONS
We now propose the design of a secure transmission scheme for networks with arbitrary
topologies and arbitrary number of destinations. This scheme consists of two phases, namely
the key generation phase (in which secret keys are generated between the source and the m
destinations) and the message sending phase (in which the message packets are first encoded
using the secret keys and then transmitted to the m destinations). The corresponding achievable
rate region is presented in Theorem 7.
Theorem 7. Let (Rˆ1, Rˆ2, . . . , Rˆm) be an achievable rate m-tuple in the absence of the eaves-
dropper. Then, the rate m-tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm) with
Ri = Rˆi
(
1− k
M
)
,∀i ∈ [m] , (14)
where M is the minimum min-cut between the source and any destination, is securely achievable
in the presence of an adversary who eavesdrops any k edges of her choice.
Proof. Let M{i} be the min-cut capacity between the source and the destination Di with i ∈
[m]. We define M as the minimum among all these individual min-cut capacities, i.e., M =
mini∈[m]M{i}. Let (Rˆ1, Rˆ2, . . . , Rˆm) ∈ Rm be the unsecure rate m-tuple achieved in the absence
of the eavesdropper. We start by approximating this rate m-tuple with rational numbers; notice
that this is always possible since the set of rationals Q is dense in R. Moreover, an information
flow through the network (from the source S to an artificial destination D′ connected to all the
destinations Di, i ∈ [m] – see also Appendix D) that achieves this rate m-tuple might involve
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fractional flows over the edges since the rate m-tuple may be fractional. To make the rate m-
tuple integer and thereby also the flow over each edge, we multiply the capacity of each edge
by a common factor T , which is the least common multiple among the denominators of all the
fractional flows. This implies that to achieve (Rˆ1, Rˆ2, . . . , Rˆm), then (TRˆ1, T Rˆ2, . . . , T Rˆm) has
to be achieved over T instances of the network after which the flow over each edge is an integer.
In what follows, we describe our coding scheme and show that
(R1, R2, . . . , Rm)=
(
1− k
M
)
(Rˆ1, Rˆ2, . . . , Rˆm) (15)
is securely achievable. This particular scheme consists of the following two phases.
• Key generation. This first phase – in which secure keys are generated between the source
and the destinations – consists of k subphases. In each subphase, the source multicasts
M − k random packets securely to all destinations. This is possible thanks to the secure
network coding result of [1], since the minimum min-cut capacity is M and Eve has access
to k edges. Thus, at the end of this phase, a total of Tk(M − k) secure keys are generated,
since in each phase we use the network T times.
• Message sending. We choose Tk packets out of the Tk(M −k) securely shared (in the key
generation phase) random packets. For each choice of Tk packets, we convert the unsecure
scheme achieving (TRˆ1, T Rˆ2, . . . , T Rˆm) to a secure scheme achieving the same rate m-
tuple. Towards this end, we expand the Tk shared packets into
∑m
j=1 TRˆj packets using an
MDS code matrix. With this, we have the same number of random packets as the message
packets. We then encode the message packets with the random packets and transmit them
as it was done in the corresponding unsecure scheme. We repeat this process until we run
out of the shared random packets, i.e., we repeat this process M − k times by using T
instances of the network each time.
Proof of security. We know that, in the absence of security considerations, a time-sharing based
scheme is optimal (i.e., capacity achieving) for the multiple unicast traffic over networks with
single source, i.e., network coding is not beneficial [5] (see also Appendix D). Given that we
are not using network coding operations and since each edge carries an integer information flow,
then the eavesdropper will be able to wiretap at most Tk different messages each encoded with
an independent key. Hence, the eavesdropper will not be able to obtain any information about
any of the m messages.
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Analysis of the achieved rate m-tuple. The secure scheme described above requires a total of
M phases. In particular, in the first k phases we generate the secure keys and in the remaining
M−k phases we securely transmit at rates of (TRˆ1, T Rˆ2, . . . , T Rˆm), over T network instances.
Thus, the achieved secure message rate (R1, R2, . . . , Rm) is
Rj =
M − k
M
Rˆj =
(
1− k
M
)
Rˆj, ∀j ∈ [m] . (16)
This concludes the proof of Theorem 7.
We now compare our two-phase scheme with the optimal scheme for networks with two
destinations. We also analyze and discuss potential reasons behind the sub-optimality of the
two-phase scheme.
A. Complexity of the two phase scheme and a comparison with the optimal scheme
The capacity achieving scheme for m = 2 destinations that we have proposed (see Section IV)
first requires that we edge-partition the original graph G into three graphs (i.e., an edge in G
appears in only one of these three graphs). At this stage, this step requires an exhaustive search
over all possible paths in the network, which requires an exponential number of operations in
the number of nodes. It therefore follows that the scheme proposed in Section IV, even though
it allows to characterize the secure capacity region, could be of exponential complexity.
Differently, the two-phase scheme proposed in this section runs in polynomial time in the
network size. This is because all the operations that it requires (i.e., finding a T such that over
T instances all flows are integer, multicasting the keys in the key generation phase, encrypting
messages at the source (i.e., encoding the messages with the keys) and routing the encrypted
messages) can be performed in polynomial time in the number of edges and nodes in the network.
The two-phase scheme described in this section is sub-optimal and does not achieve the outer
bound in (1). However, this scheme offers a guarantee on the secure rate region that can always
be achieved as a function of any rate m-tuple that is achievable in the absence of the eavesdropper
Eve (see (14) in Theorem 7). In what follows, we seek to identify some of the reasons for which
this scheme is sub-optimal.
One reason behind the sub-optimality is that in the key generation phase some edges in the
network are not used. Indeed, when we multicast the M random packets to generate the keys
(where M is the minimum of the min-cut capacities and k is the number of edges wiretapped
by the eavesdropper) – out of which M − k linear combinations are secure keys – it might
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Fig. 5: Network example for which the two-phase scheme is not optimal.
have been possible to use the other edges (i.e., those through which the random packets do not
flow) to transmit some encrypted message packets. For instance, consider the network example
in Fig. 5(a), where the eavesdropper wiretaps k = 1 edge of her choice. Our two-phase scheme
would multicast M = min
i∈[2]
M{i} = 2 random packets K1 and K2 (K1 is transmitted over the solid
edges and K2 over the dashed edges in Fig. 5(a)), out of which M − k = 1 is securely received
by D1 and D2. Hence, the combination K1 ⊕K2 can be used to securely transmit the message
packets. However, we see that in the first phase the dotted edge (i.e., the one that connects S
directly to D2) is not used. This brings to a reduction in the achievable rate region since this edge
could have been used to securely transmit a message packet to D2 by using W2⊕K1 as shown in
Fig. 5(a). Given this, we believe that one reason that makes the two-phase scheme suboptimal is
the fact that it does not fully leverage all the network resources. In Fig. 5(b), we plotted different
rate regions for the network in Fig. 5(a), which has min-cut capacities M{1} = 2, M{2} = 3 and
M{1,2} = 3. In particular, the region contained in the solid curve is the unsecure capacity region
(given by (17) in Lemma 8), the region inside the dashed curve is the secure capacity region
(given by (2) in Theorem 2) and the region contained inside the dotted curve is the secure rate
region that can be achieved by the two-phase scheme (given by (14) in Theorem 7).
Another reason behind the sub-optimality is that not all the edges are suitable for multicasting
keys. In particular, tree-like structures are more suitable to multicasting keys rather than disjoint
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Fig. 6: Network example for which the two-phase scheme is not optimal.
paths to different destinations. To see this, we consider the network shown in Fig. 6(a) with two
destinations. This network has one tree structure (represented by the solid edges in Fig. 6(a))
and one set of disjoint paths to both the destinations (represented by the two dashed edges in
Fig. 6(a)). In the two-phase scheme we use both the tree structure and the two disjoint paths
to transmit keys as well as messages, while in the optimal scheme we use the tree structure
to transmit keys and the disjoint paths to transmit messages. In Fig. 6(b), we plotted different
rate regions for the network in Fig. 6(a), which has min-cut capacities M{1} = 2, M{2} = 2
and M{1,2} = 3. The region contained in the solid curve is the unsecure capacity region (given
by (17) in Lemma 8), the region inside the dashed curve is the secure capacity region (given
by (2) in Theorem 2) and the region contained inside the dotted curve is the secure rate region
that can be achieved by the two-phase scheme (given by (14) in Theorem 7).
From Fig. 5(b) and Fig 6(b), we indeed observe that the rate region achieved by the two-phase
scheme is contained inside the secure capacity region. We can have a more complete comparison
for networks with 2 destinations. For instance, consider networks for which the min-cut capacities
to both the destinations are the same. Then, depending on the number of edges that the adversary
is eavesdropping, the capacity region and the region achieved using the two-phase scheme are
shown in Fig. 7. These figures are drawn by using Theorem 2 (regions inside the dashed curve)
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Fig. 7: Comparison of secure capacity with the rate region achieved by the two-phase scheme
for networks with two destinations.
and Theorem 7 (regions inside the dotted curve). Unsecure capacity results (regions inside the
solid curve) are obtained from Lemma 8.
VII. COMPARISONS, NON-REVERSIBILITY AND ADDITIONAL INSTANCES OF MULTIPLE
UNICAST TRAFFIC
In this section, we conclude the paper with some comparisons and analysis of other instances
of multiple unicast traffic. In particular, in Section VII-A, we compare the secure rate region
for m = 2 destinations in Theorem 2 with the capacity region when the adversary is absent.
The goal of this analysis is to quantify the rate loss that is incurred to guarantee security. In
Section VII-B, we prove that the secure capacity region for m = 2 destinations is non-reversible.
Specifically, we show that, if we switch the role of the source and destinations and we reverse
the directions of the edges, then the new secure capacity region differs from the original one.
This is a surprising result since it implies that – different from the unsecure case where non-
reversible networks must necessary have non-linear network coding solutions [26], [27] – under
security constraints even networks with linear network coding solutions can be non-reversible if
the traffic is multiple unicast. Finally, in Section VII-C, we consider other instances of multiple
unicast traffic, such as networks with erasure links and noiseless networks with two sources and
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two destinations. For some specific network topologies, we derive the secure capacity region.
This analysis sheds light on how coding should be performed across different unicast sessions.
A. Comparison with the Unsecure Capacity Region
The unsecure capacity region (i.e., capacity in the absence of the eavesdropper) for a multiple
unicast network with a single source and multiple destinations described in Section II, is well
known [5, Theorem 9] and given by the following lemma. For completeness we report the proof
of the following lemma in Appendix D.
Lemma 8. The unsecure capacity region for the multiple unicast traffic over networks with single
source node and m destination nodes is given by
RA ≤MA, ∀A ⊆ [m] , (17)
where RA :=
∑
i∈A
Ri and MA is the min-cut capacity between the source S and the set of
destinations DA := {Di : i ∈ A}.
For networks with m = 2 destinations, we compare the secure capacity region in Theorem 2
and the unsecure capacity region in Lemma 8. By comparing (2) with (17) (evaluated for the
case m = 2), we observe that in the presence of the eavesdropper we lose at most a rate k in
each dimension compared to the unsecure case. We notice that the same result holds for the case
of m = 1 destination and for the case of multicasting the same message to all destinations [1]
(i.e., we have a rate loss of k with respect to the min-cut capacity M ). However, here it is more
surprising since the messages to the m = 2 destinations (and potentially the keys) are different.
B. Non-Reversibility of the Secure Capacity Region
In order to characterize the unsecure capacity region in (17), network coding is not necessary
and routing is sufficient (see also Appendix D). Thus, from the result in [27], it directly follows
that the capacity result in (17) is reversible. In particular, let G be a network with single source
and m destinations with a certain capacity region (that can be computed from Lemma 8). Then,
the reverse graph G ′ is constructed by switching the role of the source and destinations and by
reversing the directions of the edges. Thus, G ′ will have m sources and one single destination.
The result in [27] ensures that G and G ′ will have the same capacity region, i.e., the result in
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Lemma 8 characterizes also the unsecure capacity region for the multiple unicast traffic over
networks with m sources and single destination.
We now focus on the secure case. In Section IV, we have characterized the secure capacity
region for a multiple unicast network with single source and m = 2 destinations. In particular,
Theorem 2 implies that the secure capacity region does not depend on the specific topology of the
network and it can be fully characterized by the min-cut capacities M{1},M{2} and M{1,2} and
by the number k of edges eavesdropped by Eve. We now show that this result is non-reversible,
i.e., the secure capacity region of the reverse network is not the same as the one of the original
network. Moreover, we also show that the secure capacity region of networks with 2 sources
and single destination cannot anymore be characterized by only the min-cut capacities, i.e., it
depends on the specific network topology.
Consider the three networks in Fig. 8 and assume k = 1, i.e., Eve wiretaps one edge of her
choice. For the network in Fig. 8(a) we have min-cut capacities
(
M{1},M{2},M{1,2}
)
= (1, 2, 2)
and hence from Theorem 2 it follows that the secure capacity for this network is given by
(R1, R2) = (0, 1). This point can be achieved by simply using the scheme shown in Fig. 8(a),
where K represents the key and W2 the message for D2. Now, consider the network in Fig. 8(b)
that is obtained from Fig. 8(a) by switching the role of the source and destinations and by
reversing the directions of the edges. For this network, which has the same min-cut capacities as
the network in Fig. 8(a), the rate pair (R1, R2) = (1, 0) is securely achievable using the scheme
shown in Fig. 8(b) where W1 is the message of S1 and K1 and K2 are the keys generated by S1
and S2, respectively. The rate pair (R1, R2) = (1, 0), which is securely achieved by the network
in Fig. 8(b), cannot be securely achieved by the network in Fig. 8(a). This result implies that a
secure rate pair that is feasible for one network might not be feasible for the reverse network,
i.e., the secure capacity regions can be different and hence cannot be derived from one another.
The achievability of the pair (R1, R2) = (1, 0) in Fig. 8(b) also shows that the outer bound
in (1) does not hold for networks with single destination and multiple sources, in which case it
is possible to achieve rates outside this region.
Consider now the network in Fig. 8(c). This network has the same min-cut capacities as
the network in Fig. 8(b), i.e.,
(
M{1},M{2},M{1,2}
)
= (1, 2, 2). We now show that the rate pair
(R1, R2) = (1, 0), which can be securely achieved in the network in Fig. 8(b), cannot be securely
achieved in the network in Fig. 8(c). Let Xi, i ∈ [1 : 4], be the transmitted symbols as shown in
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Fig. 8: Network examples for non-reversibility.
Fig. 8(c). With this, we have
R1 = H(W1)
(a)
= H(W1)−H(W1|X3, X4)
(b)
≤ H(W1)−H(W1|X1, X2, X3)
= I(W1;X1, X2, X3) = I(W1;X1) + I(W1;X2, X3|X1)
(c)
= I(W1;X2, X3|X1) = H(X2, X3|X1)−H(X2, X3|W1, X1)
(d)
= H(X2, X3)−H(X2, X3) = 0 ,
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows because of the decodability constraint; (ii) the inequality
in (b) follows because of the ‘conditioning reduces the entropy’ principle and since X4 is
a deterministic function of (X1, X2); (iii) the equality in (c) follows because of the perfect
secrecy requirement; (iv) finally, the equality in (d) follows since (X2, X3) is independent of
(W1, X1). This result shows that the rate pair (R1, R2) = (1, 0) is not securely achievable in
the network in Fig. 8(c). This implies that, for a network with single destination and multiple
sources, we cannot characterize the secure capacity region based only on the min-cut capacities(
M{1},M{2},M{1,2}
)
, i.e., the result would depend on the specific network topology.
C. Analysis on Other Instances of Multiple Unicast Traffic
In this paper, we have focused on noiseless networks with unit edge capacities having a single
source and multiple destinations. We now consider other instances of multiple unicast traffic, and
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Fig. 9: (a) The Y-network, (b) The RY-network and (c) The X-network.
provide secure capacity results for some specific configurations. The main goal of this analysis
is to highlight the critical role of coding across different unicast sessions in order to ensure a
secure communication, even for scenarios where it is not required in the absence of an adversary.
1) Erasure Networks: In [28], we considered multiple unicast traffic over the three erasure
networks shown in Fig. 9, referred to as the Y-network, the Reverse Y (RY)-network and the
X-network. In the Y-network, two sources wish to communicate two independent messages to a
common destination. In the RY-network, one source aims to communicate two independent mes-
sages to two different destinations. Finally, in the X-network two sources seek to communicate
two independent messages to two different destinations. In all three cases, only the source(s)
can generate randomness; while in Fig. 9(a) and Fig. 9(c) sources can generate randomness
at an infinite rate, in Fig. 9(b) the source can generate randomness only at a finite rate D0.
These assumption are motivated by the fact that one can construct the X-network by combining
the Y-Network and the RY-network. Each edge e on these three networks models an erasure
channel where the legitimate receiver has an erasure probability of δe and the adversary has
an erasure probability of δeE. Public feedback, which in [29] was shown to increase the secure
capacity, is used, i.e., each of the legitimate nodes involved in the communication sends an
acknowledgment after each transmission; this is received by all nodes in the network as well as
by the eavesdropper (who can wiretap any k = 1 channel of the network). In [28], we derived
the secure capacity region for the three networks in Fig. 9, as the solution of some feasibility
programs that, for completeness we report in Appendix E-A. In particular, our capacity-achieving
secure transmission schemes consist of two phases. In the first phase, a link by link key is
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shared, and in the second phase encrypted message packets (i.e., encoded with the keys that
were generated in the first phase) are transmitted. The key sharing mechanism involves a mix
of communicating random symbols using an MDS code and an Automated Repeat ReQuest
(ARQ) based scheme. We start by noting that, in order to characterize the capacity region
of the three networks in Fig. 9 in the absence of the adversary, coding is not needed and a
simple time-sharing approach among the two unicast sessions is capacity-achieving. However,
under security considerations, coding becomes of fundamental importance. With the primal goal
to show the benefits of coding across the two unicast sessions, we here compare the secure
capacity performance of our schemes (see Propositions 10-12 in Appendix E-A) with respect to
two naive strategies, i.e., the path sharing and the link sharing. In the path sharing the whole
communication resources, at each time instant, are used only by one session; for example, for
the X-network we have a time-sharing between S1-I1-I2-D1 and S2-I1-I2-D2. Differently, in
the link sharing strategy only the shared communication link is time-shared among the two
unicast sessions; for example, in the X-network only the I1-I2 link is time-shared. For both
these strategies we do not allow the source node that does not participate to act as a source of
randomness, e.g., for the X-network the random packets sent by S1 cannot be used to encode the
message packets of S2. Fig. 10 shows the performance (in terms of secure capacity region) of
these two time-sharing strategies and of our schemes (see Propositions 10-12 in Appendix E-A).
From Fig. 10, we observe that our schemes (solid line) achieve higher rates compared to the
two time-sharing strategies. In general, these gains follow since: (i) in the Y-network S1 and S2
transmit random packets to I and these can be mixed to create a key on the shared link; (ii)
in the RY-network the same set of random packets can be used to generate keys for both the
I-D1 and I-D2 links. These factors, which involve coding operations across the two sessions,
decrease the number of random packets required to be sent from the source(s) and implies that
more message packets can be carried. Finally, (iii) in the X-network we have the benefits of
both the Y- and RY-network.
2) Arbitrary Edge Capacities: In [30], we considered the four noiseless networks shown in
Fig. 11, which are derived from the celebrated butterfly network. In particular, the edges can
have arbitrary capacity, which represents a main difference with respect to the model analyzed
in the previous sections. Over these networks, we assume that the passive eavesdropper can
wiretap any k = 1 edge of her choice, and that only the source(s) can generate randomness at
infinite rate. In [30], we derived both the secure and the unsecure capacity regions for these
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Fig. 10: Numerical evaluations for the three networks in Fig. 9.
four networks, which for completeness we report in Appendix E-B. In particular, our capacity-
achieving schemes show the critical importance of coding across the two unicast sessions, as
opposite to a naive time-sharing approach. For instance, consider the butterfly network with
single source in Fig. 11(b), with all edge capacities equal to C and R1 = R2 = R. Over this
network, if we simply timeshare across the two sessions, then we get R ≤ C
2
, i.e., the edge
between I1 and I2 is the bottleneck. However, by using the coding operation (i.e., the same
secret key can be used by the two sessions), we obtain R ≤ C, i.e., we can transmit at a double
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Fig. 11: Networks derived from the butterfly network.
rate (see (25) in Appendix E-B). When all edge capacities are equal to C and R1 = R2 = R,
we can also draw the following additional conclusions.
• Secure communication can incur significant rate losses with respect to the unsecure case.
The rate losses can be quantified as: (i) 100% for butterfly network 1 (secure communication
is not possible); (ii) more than 33% for the case of single source (R ≤ 3
2
C without security
and R ≤ C with security); (iii) more than 66% for the case of single destination and butterfly
network 2 (R ≤ 3
2
C without security and R ≤ C
2
with security).
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• For unsecure communication, the butterfly networks with single source and single destination
achieve a rate gain of 50% over butterfly network 1. This gain is due to an increase in the
min-cut values, which are tight and evaluate to R ≤ C in the butterfly network 1 and to
R ≤ 3
2
C in the cases of single source and single destination.
• Under security considerations, the case of single source (i.e., R ≤ C) brings higher through-
put gains than the single destination case (R ≤ C
2
). This is because in the former case, coding
opportunities arise, i.e., the same key can be used by the two sessions. Moreover, thanks
to the multipath diversity, these two cases enable secure communication, which was not
possible over the butterfly network 1. Regarding the butterfly network 2 the case of single
source brings secure rate advantages. Actually, for both the butterfly network 2 and the case
of single source, the min-cut values evaluate to R ≤ 3
2
C, but the secure rate achieved in the
former case, i.e., R ≤ C
2
, is half the one achieved in the latter case, i.e., R ≤ C.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
For completeness, we here report the proof of the result in Lemma 3, which is a direct
consequence of [8, Theorem 1]. In particular, this result shows that any graph G with single
source and m = 2 destinations is separable. The graph G has min-cut capacity M{i}, i ∈ [2],
towards destination Di and min-cut capacity M{1,2} towards {D1, D2}, from which M?{i}, i ∈ [2],
and M?{1,2} can be computed by using the expressions in (4). We represent these min-cut capacities
by the triple(
M{1},M{2},M{1,2}
)
=
(
M?{1}+M
?
{1,2},M
?
{2}+M
?
{1,2},M
?
{1}+M
?
{2} +M
?
{1,2}
)
,
where the equality follows by using (4). We now prove Lemma 3 in two steps. We first show
that the graph G can be separated into two graphs: Ga with min-cut capacities
(
M?{1}, 0,M
?
{1}
)
and Gb with min-cut capacities(
M?{1,2},M
?
{2} +M
?
{1,2},M
?
{2} +M
?
{1,2}
)
.
Then, by applying the same principle we further separate the graph Gb into two graphs: Gc with
min-cut capacities
(
0,M?{2},M
?
{2}
)
and Gd with min-cut capacities
(
M?{1,2},M
?
{1,2},M
?
{1,2}
)
. This
would complete the proof of Lemma 3.
We now prove that we can separate the graph G into the two graphs Ga and Gb. Towards this
end, from the original graph G, we create a new directed acyclic graph G ′ where a new node
35
D′ is connected to D1 through an edge of capacity M?{1} + M
?
{1,2} and to D2 through an edge
of capacity M?{2}. By following similar steps as in the proof of the direct part (achievabiliy) of
Lemma 8 (see Appendix D), it is not difficult to see that in G ′ the min-cut capacity between
S and D′ is M?{1} + M
?
{1,2} + M
?
{2} = M{1,2}, where the equality follows from (4c). From the
max-flow min-cut theorem, we can find M{1,2} edge-disjoint paths from S to D′; we color the
edges in these paths green. We can also find M{2} edge-disjoint paths from S to D2; we color
the edges in these paths red. Notice that, at the end of this process, some of the edges can have
both green and red colors. We also highlight that:
• Out of the M{1,2} green paths from S to D′, M?{1}+M
?
{1,2} paths flow through D1 and M
?
{2}
flow through D2.
• If a path is exclusively green, it flows through D1 since otherwise, in addition to the M{2}
red edge-disjoint paths from S to D2, we would have also this path and thereby violate the
min-cut capacity constraint to D2.
The second observation above implies that, if there are M?{1} exclusively green paths, then
we can separate the graph G ′ into two graphs: G ′a that contains all these M?{1} exclusively green
paths and G ′b that contains all the edges of G ′ that are not in G ′a. Given this, by simply removing
the node D′ and its incoming edges, we get Ga and Gb. We now show how we can obtain these
M?{1} exclusively green paths. Towards this end, we denote with P the set of all green paths
from S to D′ (notice that these paths might have also some red edges). Then, until there exists
a path p ∈ P such that either it is not exclusively green or it does not start with an edge that is
both red and green, we apply the two following steps:
1) Let e be the first edge in p, which is both green and red and denote with g the red path
from S to D2 that contains the edge e. Recall that, since the M{2} red paths are edge-
disjoint, there is only one red path g passing through e. We split the path p into two parts
as p1 − e− p2 and similarly we split the path g into g1 − e− g2.
2) We add the red color to p1 (that before was all green) and we remove the red color from
g1, i.e., now each edge in g1 is either green or it does not have any color. Note that in this
way we replace the red path g1 − e− g2 with p1 − e− g2 from source S to D2, which is
also disjoint from the rest of M{2} − 1 red paths.
We note that this process will stop only when all the M{1,2} paths from S to D′ are either
exclusively green or start with an edge that is both red and green. We also note that, since we did
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not remove any edge, clearly we also did not change any min-cut capacity during this process.
Since initially there were M{2} red edges coming out of S and, in the process of the algorithm,
we replaced one red by another red, then the number of red edges outgoing from S still remains
the same. Thus, among the M{1,2} paths from S to D′, only at most M{2} paths start with an
edge that is both green and red and therefore, by using (4), at least M?{1} are exclusively green
paths. This proves that the original graph G can be separated into the two graphs Ga and Gb.
By using similar arguments, one can then show that the graph Gb can be separated into the two
graphs Gc and Gd. This concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF EXISTENCE OF E IN (11) FOR A RELIABLE DECODING
The destination Di will receive symbols {Xej , j ∈ Mi}. Further, since Ni is the right null
space of Vi in (9), then any vector that belongs to Ni will have non-zero components only in
the positions indexed by {i ∈Mi}. It therefore follows that an inner product between a vector
in Ni and [Xe1 , . . . , Xem ] is a valid decoding scheme.
Let d(1)i , d
(2)
i , . . . , d
(Ri)
i be the Ri column vectors, each of length t, selected from Ni. We
assume that the selected {dji , i ∈ [m], j ∈ [Ri]} are linearly independent – see our assumption
in Proposition 4. We can write the messages decoded at destination Di, denoted by Wˆi, as
follows
Wˆi =
[
Xe1 Xe2 . . . Xet
] [
d
(1)
i d
(2)
i . . . d
(Ri)
i
]
. (18)
We can stack all the decoded messages at the m destinations together and obtain[
Wˆ1 Wˆ2 . . . Wˆm
]
=
[
Xe1 Xe2 . . . Xet
] [
d
(1)
1 . . . d
(R1)
1 d
(1)
2 . . . d
(R2)
2 . . . d
(1)
m . . . d
(Rm)
m
]
(a)
=

W T1
W T2
...
W Tm
KT

T
ET
V
[d(1)1 . . . d(R1)1 d(1)2 . . . d(R2)2 . . . d(1)m . . . d(Rm)m ]
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=

W T1
W T2
...
W Tm
KT

T 
ET
[
d
(1)
1 . . . d
(R1)
1 d
(1)
2 . . . d
(R2)
2 . . . d
(1)
m . . . d
(Rm)
m
]
V
[
d
(1)
1 . . . d
(R1)
1 d
(1)
2 . . . d
(R2)
2 . . . d
(1)
m . . . d
(Rm)
m
]

(b)
=

W T1
W T2
...
W Tm
KT

T 
ET
[
d
(1)
1 . . . d
(R1)
1 d
(1)
2 . . . d
(R2)
2 . . . d
(1)
m . . . d
(Rm)
m
]
0t×∑mi=1Ri

=

W T1
W T2
...
W Tm

T
ET
[
d
(1)
1 . . . d
(R1)
1 d
(1)
2 . . . d
(R2)
2 . . . d
(1)
m . . . d
(Rm)
m
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
,
where the equality in (a) follows by using the definition in (11) and the equality in (b) is due
to the fact that the vectors in {d(j)i } are in the null space Ni, which is contained inside the null
space of V . Since we assumed that the selected {dji , i ∈ [m], j ∈ [Ri]} are linearly independent,
then this implies that the matrix D has rank
∑m
i=1Ri. Then, since E
T is a matrix of dimension∑m
i=1Ri × t, one can always find a matrix ET such that,
ETD = I∑m
i=1Ri
.
Thus, we get, [
Wˆ1 Wˆ2 . . . Wˆm
]
=
[
W1 W2 . . . Wm
]
.
This concludes the proof that there exists a choice of the matrix E in (11), which ensures that
all the destinations reliably decode their intended messages.
APPENDIX C
PROOF THAT THE RATE REGION IN (13) IS SECURELY ACHIEVABLE
In order to show that the rate region in (13) is securely achievable, we use a two-step proof.
First, we determine all the feasible (R1, R2) pairs that can be selected from the null space Ni,
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such that the assumption in Proposition 4 is satisfied, namely such that the R1 + R2 selected
vectors are linearly independent. Hence, the result in Proposition 4 implies that any point in this
region is achievable. Then, we prove that the convex hull of these feasible rate pairs is indeed
the region in (13). The proposition below represents the first step of our proof.
Proposition 9. The convex hull of all (R1, R2) rate pairs such that we can select R1 vectors
from N1 and R2 vectors from N2, with all of these vectors being linearly independent, is given
by the following region
R1 ≤ dim(N1),
R2 ≤ dim(N2),
R1 +R2 ≤ dim(N1 +N2),
where + denotes the sum of subspaces N1 and N2.
Proof. We first show that we can select dim(N1) vectors from N1 and dim(N1 +N2)−dim(N1)
vectors from N2, such that all these vectors are linearly independent. We have:
• N1 is of dimension dim(N1) and so we select dim(N1) independent vectors from this space.
One feasible choice consists of selecting the basis of the subspace N1. Thus, R1 = dim(N1).
• In the basis of N1 +N2 there are dim(N1 +N2) independent vectors. Moreover, note that
the basis of N1 +N2 is a subset of the basis of N1 union with the basis on N2. So we can
select vectors from the basis of N2 as long as we select an independent vector. Thus, we
can select dim(N1 +N2)− dim(N1) vectors from N2, i.e., R2 = dim(N1 +N2)− dim(N1).
By symmetry, one can also first select dim(N2) vectors from the null space N2 and then
dim(N1 + N2) − dim(N2) vectors from the null space N1. For this case, one would get R2 =
dim(N2) and R1 = dim(N1 +N2)− dim(N2). This completes the proof since these are the only
non-trivial corner points for the region given in Proposition 9.
We now prove that the region given in Proposition 9 coincides with the region given in
Proposition 6. We start by noting that we can rewrite the rate region in (13) as
R1 ≤ [|M1| − k]+ ,
R2 ≤ [|M2| − k]+ ,
R1 +R2 ≤ min
(
[|M1| − k]+ + [|M2| − k]+ , [|M1 ∪M2| − k]+
)
.
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Since, as we have proved in (10), dim(Ni) = [|Mi| − k]+ , ∀i ∈ [m], then we only need to
show that
dim(N1 +N2) = min
(
[|M1| − k]+ + [|M2| − k]+ , [|M1 ∪M2| − k]+
)
.
The dimension of the sum of two subspaces can be computed as
dim(N1 +N2) = dim(N1) + dim(N2)− dim(N1 ∩N2).
Thus, we now need to compute dim(N1 ∩ N2). We note that N1 ∩ N2 is the null space of the
matrix
V ?1,2 =
V
C
 , where C =
C1
C2
 ,
with C1 and C2 being defined as in (9). Moreover, there will be t − |M1 ∩M2| distinct rows
in C, and following the argument based on V being the generator matrix of a (t, k, t − k + 1)
MDS code, then the number of independent rows in V ?1,2 is min(t, k + t− |M1 ∩M2|). Thus,
dim(N1 ∩N2) = t−min(t, k + t− |M1 ∩M2|) = [|M1 ∩M2| − k]+ ,
which leads to
dim(N1 +N2) = [|M1| − k]+ + [|M2| − k]+ − [|M1 ∩M2| − k]+
= min
(
(|M1| − k)+ + (|M2| − k)+ , (|M1 ∪M2| − k)+
)
.
The last equality can be verified by considering all possible four cases, namely: (1) |M1| ≥
k, |M2| ≥ k, (2) |M1| < k, |M2| ≥ k, (3) |M1| ≥ k, |M2| < k and (4) |M1| < k, |M2| < k.
This concludes the proof that the rate region in (13) is securely achievable.
APPENDIX D
UNSECURE CAPACITY FOR SINGLE SOURCE MULTIPLE UNICAST TRAFFIC
We here give the proof of Lemma 8 (originally proved in [5, Theorem 9]). We start by noting
that, by setting k = 0 in the outer bound in (1), we readily obtain the rate region in (17). It
therefore follows that (17) is an outer bound on the capacity region of a multiple unicast network
with single source and m destinations. We now prove that the region in (17) is also achievable.
Assume that a rate m-tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm) satisfies the constraint in (17). We now prove that
this m-tuple is achievable. Towards this end, from the original graph G, we create a new directed
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acyclic graph G ′ where a new node D′ is connected to each Di, i ∈ [m], through an edge E ′i of
capacity Ri. It is not difficult to see that in G ′, the min-cut capacity between S and D′ is
m∑
i=1
Ri.
This can be explained as follows. Suppose that the min-cut from S to D′, in addition to a subset
of E (i.e., the set of edges in the original G), also contains some edges E ′J , with J ⊆ [m]. This
clearly implies that the subset of edges from E should form a cut between source S and D[m]\J ,
otherwise we would not have a cut between S and D′. Thus, the min-cut has a capacity of at
least
∑
i∈J
Ri +M{D[m]\J} and, since
∑
i∈[m]\J
Ri ≤M{D[m]\J} (this follows from the outer bound
proved above), the min-cut has a capacity of at least
m∑
i=1
Ri. Then, since the set E ′[m] is a cut of
capacity
m∑
i=1
Ri, it follows that the min-cut has a capacity of at most
m∑
i
Ri. This implies that
the min-cut capacity between S and D′ in G ′ is
m∑
i=1
Ri. With this, the achievability of the rate
m-tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm) that satisfies the constraint in (17) directly follows from the max-flow
min-cut theorem. Indeed, since one can communicate a total information of
m∑
i=1
Ri from S to
D′ in G ′, then this is possible only if an amount Ri of information flows through Di, i ∈ [m],
in G. This concludes the proof of Lemma 8. Notice that in order to transmit
m∑
i=1
Ri message
packets from S to D′ (single unicast session) network coding is not needed. Thus, there is no
need of coding operations to characterize the capacity region of a network with single source
and multiple destinations.
APPENDIX E
SECURE CAPACITY RESULTS ON OTHER INSTANCES OF MULTIPLE UNICAST TRAFFIC
A. Erasure Networks
We here report the secure capacity region results that we derived in [28] for the three networks
in Fig. 9. In particular, the secure capacity regions can be found as the solution of some feasibility
programs. We refer an interested reader to [28] for the complete proof of these results.
Proposition 10. The secure capacity region of the Y-network in Fig. 9(a) is given by
kj ≥ Rj 1− δjE
1− δjδjE , j ∈ [2], (19a)
k3 ≥ (R1 +R2) 1− δ3E
1− δ3δ3E , (19b)
Rj
1− δj +
kj
(1− δj)δjE ≤ 1, j ∈ [2], (19c)
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R1 +R2
1− δ3 +
k3
(1− δ3)δ3E ≤ 1, (19d)
k3 ≤
(
k1
δ1E
+
k2
δ2E
)
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E , (19e)
Ri, kj ≥ 0, i ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [3], (19f)
where: (i) the first and the second constraints ensure that enough keys are generated, i.e., the
number of generated keys is larger than the amount of information received by the adversary;
(ii) the third and the fourth inequalities are time constraints ensuring that the length of the key
generation phase plus the length of the message sending phase do not exceed the total available
time; (iii) finally, the fifth constraint follows since node I has zero randomness and so the key
that it can generate is constrained by the randomness received from S1 and S2.
Proposition 11. The secure capacity region of the RY-network in Fig. 9(b) is given by
k3 + e
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E ≥ (R1 +R2)
1− δ3E
1− δ3δ3E , (20a)
kj ≥ Rj 1− δjE
1− δjδjE , j ∈ [2], (20b)
R1 +R2
1− δ3 +
k3
(1− δ3)δ3E +
e
1− δ3 ≤ 1, (20c)
Rj
1− δj +
kj
(1− δj)δjE ≤ 1, j ∈ [2], (20d)
k3 ≤ (D0 − e)(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E , (20e)
kj ≤
(
e+
k3
δ3E
)
(1− δj)δjE
1− δjδjE , j ∈ [2], (20f)
Ri, e, kj ≥ 0, i ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [3], (20g)
where: (i) the first and the second constraints ensure that enough keys are generated, i.e., the
number of generated keys is larger than the amount of information received by the adversary;
(ii) the third and the fourth inequalities are time constraints ensuring that the length of the key
generation phase plus the length of the message sending phase do not exceed the total available
time; (iii) finally, the fifth (respectively, sixth) constraint is due to the fact that the key that node
S (respectively, node I) can create is constrained by its limited randomness (respectively, the
randomness that it receives from S).
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Proposition 12. The secure capacity region of the X-network in Fig. 9(c) is given by
kj ≥ Rj 1− δjE
1− δjδjE , j ∈ [2], (21a)
k3 + e
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E ≥ (R1 +R2)
1− δ3E
1− δ3δ3E , (21b)
kj ≥ Rj−3 1− δjE
1− δjδjE , j ∈ [4 : 5], (21c)
Rj
1− δj +
kj
(1− δj)δjE ≤ 1, j ∈ [2], (21d)
Rj−3
1− δj +
kj
(1− δj)δjE ≤ 1, j ∈ [4 : 5], (21e)
R1 +R2
1− δ3 +
k3
(1− δ3)δ3E +
e
1− δ3 ≤ 1, (21f)
k3 ≤
(
k1
δ1E
+
k2
δ2E
− e
)
(1− δ3)δ3E
1− δ3δ3E , (21g)
kj ≤
(
e+
k3
δ3E
)
(1− δj)δjE
1− δjδjE , j ∈ [4 : 5], (21h)
Ri, e, kj ≥ 0, i ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [5], (21i)
where: (i) the first, second and third constraints ensure that enough keys are generated, i.e., the
number of generated keys is larger than the amount of information received by the adversary;
(ii) the fourth, fifth and sixth inequalities are time constraints ensuring that the length of the key
generation phase plus the length of the message sending phase do not exceed the total available
time; (iii) finally, the seventh and the eight constraints are due to the fact that the key that a
node can create is constrained by the randomness that it receives from previous nodes.
B. Arbitrary Edge Capacities
We here report the unsecure and secure capacity region results that we derived in [30] for the
four networks in Fig. 11. In particular, these results are shown in Table II. We refer an interested
reader to [30] for the complete proof of these results.
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